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INTRODUCTION
One of the most important issues facing administrative lawyers today is that
of the appropriate role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy. This
concern is at the centre of many of the recent important decisions on the
legality, rationality and reasonableness of exercises of public power.1 Under
apartheid, the courts were often seen as the only, if not always effective,
protectors of individuals against the state. Given this historical context,
arguments for a less active judiciary continue to be viewed as politically
conservative.2 However, recent arguments emphasize the need for the role
of the judiciary to be examined more closely, with a view to developing a
‘theory of deference’ and introducing some variability into the level at which
state action is scrutinised.3 It has been pointed out that the ‘climate of
constitutional justification’4 in which our law now operates ‘requires
justification for the exercise of judicial power as much as any other sort of
power’.5
Negative responses to the idea of deference are not difficult to understand.
Traditionally, deference has been defined as ‘[a] yielding of judgment or
preference from respect to the wishes or opinion of another; submission in
opinion; regard; respect; complaisance’.6 Applied to judicial review, this
definition entails a complete submission of the courts to the administration,
* BALLB (Natal) LLM (London). My thanks to Hugh Corder, Francois du Bois, Dee Smythe and Justin
Goldblatt for their useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374
(CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC); President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR
1059 (CC); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: Ex parte President of the Republic of South
Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) and Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape, 2002 (3) SA 265
(CC), in particular.
2 Cora Hoexter ‘The future of judicial review in SouthAfrican administrative law’ (2000) 117 SALJ 484
at 499–500.
3 Hoexter op cit note 2 at 500–3.
4 Hugh Corder ‘Administrative justice: A cornerstone of South Africa’s democracy’ (1998) 14 SAJHR
38 at 41.
5 Hoexter op cit note 2 at 500.
6 Webster’s Dictionary (1913 edition).
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the executive or the legislature. However, in the modern context of judicial
review, the term has been interpreted to mean:
‘[A] judicial willingness to appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of
administrative agencies; to admit the expertise of those agencies in policy-laden or polycentric issues; to
accord their interpretation of fact and law due respect; and to be sensitive in general to the interests
legitimately pursued by administrative bodies and the practical and financial constraints under which
they operate.’ 7
From the perspective of this definition, deference is far less objectionable
to those who have traditionally argued for an expanded role for the judiciary,
since everyone agrees that there should be some variability in standards of
review, rather than a general principle of non-intervention. It is my view
that the issue is not one of whether courts should, as a rule, exercise a high
degree of deference but when they should do so. Moreover, the decision by a
court to exercise a degree of restraint requires justification in much the same
way that the decision to intervene does.
The aim of this article is to examine the concept of reasonableness as a
standard for evaluating administrative action. I do not intend to argue either
that the approach by the courts thus far has been too deferential or not
deferential enough but, rather, that it has been incoherent. The decision
regarding how high a standard of review should be applied must be based on
factors such as the kind of action being reviewed as well as the constitutional
and legislative requirements; and must be applied consistently across the
cases. In trying to determine what the content of the reasonableness standard
should be in the review of administrative action, I will draw on develop-
ments in two other areas of the law where reasonableness is used as a means
to evaluate state action: the enforcement of socio-economic rights and the
liability of the state for negligent omissions in delict.
The comparison is useful because the reason for courts wishing to define
the parameters of their involvement in these three areas is the same: there is a
concern about the institutional capacity and mandate of the courts. Because a
court’s power to evaluate the reasonableness of state action leaves open the
possibility for a judge to substitute his or her views on the best approach in a
given circumstance for that of the original decision-maker, reasonableness is
controversial. Thus, it is imperative that the content given to the concept
and that this be applied consistently across the cases.
I will argue that, when a court is called upon to review an administrative act
on the basis that it is unreasonable, reasonableness must include a
proportionality analysis. There are a number of reasons for this argument.
First, executive action has been held to be reviewable on the basis of
rationality. As administrative action is susceptible to a higher standard of
review, reasonableness cannot be held to mean the same thing as rationality.
Secondly, reasonableness and rationality are conceptually different: a rational
connection between means and end is only one aspect of a standard of
7 Hoexter op cit 2 at 501–2.
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reasonableness. Thirdly, the inclusion of proportionality need not inevitably
result in a court substituting its view for the expertise of an official.
To take the argument further, I draw on the socio-economic rights cases
decided by the Constitutional Court thus far. In determining whether a state
policy is reasonable or not, the court has been cognizant of the separation of
powers principle but has, nonetheless, applied a proportionality test as one
element of reasonableness. Given the common underlying concerns, there is
no reason why the same should not apply when a court reviews an
administrative act of the ground of unreasonableness. Finally, I explore
developments in the area of state liability for omissions in delict. Again, the
concerns regarding the appropriate role of the courts underlie the attempt to
re-define the test for wrongfulness to cater for the action or inaction of
public bodies. It is my argument that the standard of reasonableness in all
three areas should be the same. However, the approach of the courts, thus
far, has not reflected this.
LEGALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
The principle of legality in administrative law has taken on new meaning
since the coming into operation of the Constitution. Whilst legality under
the common law was determined in relation to legislative intent, legality is
now to be determined with reference to constitutional requirements. The
development of the principle of legality has been most striking in a series of
cases considering the definition of ‘administrative action’: Fedsure Life
Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council,8 President
of the Republic of South Africa v SARFU,9 and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association of South Africa: Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa.10 In
these cases, the Constitutional Court held that, even though the acts
concerned were not administrative, they were, as exercises of public power,
still subject to constitutional scrutiny on the basis of the principle of legality,
underpinning the Constitution.
The courts (mainly the Constitutional Court) began grappling with the
concept of ‘administrative action’ in a series of cases, starting with Fedsure Life
Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council.11 The
case concerned the review of resolutions made by local government
structures in the ‘greater Johannesburg municipal area’12 and was brought
under s 24 of the interim Constitution, which protected the right to just
administrative action. The court, per Chaskalson P, Goldstone J and
O’Regan J, discussed the changes to local government brought about by the
8 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC).
9 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC).
10 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC).
11 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC).
12 Fedsure supra note 1 para 1. See also para 15. For a more detailed account of the circumstances under
which the case arose, and an analysis of the case, see Jonathan Klaaren ‘Redlight, greenlight: Fedsure Life
Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council; Premier Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of
State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 209.
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Constitution. They found that, under both the interim and final Constitu-
tions, ‘a local government is no longer a public body exercising delegated
powers. Its council is a deliberative legislative assembly with legislative and
executive powers recognized in the Constitution itself.’13 Consequently, the
court held that the imposition of rates and levies by the local authorities
(municipalities) was not administrative action.14 However, the court did find
that the municipalities, being bound by the Constitution, had to meet the
requirement of legality, which underpins the Constitution.15
Although the Constitution (then interim) itself did not specifically
provide that a local government acts unconstitutionally when it acts outside
its statutory powers, this principle was implied by various constitutional
provisions dealing with the powers and functions of local government.16
As was stated in the judgment, this proposition is unsurprising because:
‘[I]t is a fundamental principle of the rule of law, recognised widely, that the exercise of public power is
only legitimate where lawful. The rule of law — to the extent at least that it expresses this principle of
legality — is generally understood to be a fundamental principle of constitutional law’.17
The only question is where the requirements of legality are to be found.
Where one is dealing with the exercise of constitutional powers, that which
makes an action lawful depends on the provisions of the Constitution
itself—and the requirements for legality might be express or implicit.18
Thus, the court looked first to the provisions of the Constitution in
determining the content of the controls on the powers of local government
legislatures. In addition, because the constitutional provisions themselves
made reference to ‘other laws made by a competent authority’,19 these were
also taken into account in reviewing the actions.
The Constitutional Court had to again consider the issue of what
‘administrative action’ means in the case of President of the Republic of South
Africa v SARFU.20 In this case, the action concerned was the appointment of
a commission of inquiry by the President. The court found that this did not
constitute ‘administrative action’ for the purposes of s 24. The court held that
the power to appoint a commission of enquiry granted to the President by
s 84(2) of the Constitution, was not concerned with the implementation of
legislation (as is most administrative action) but with the formulation of
policy. It was an original constitutional power, controlled by the Constitu-
tion itself.21 Again, the court referred to a broad principle of legality, deriving
from the Constitution as a whole, by which the President was bound.22
13 Fedsure supra note 1 para 26.
14 Ibid para 34.
15 Ibid para 59.
16 Ibid paras 54 and 55.
17 Ibid para 56.
18 Ibid para 58.
19 Ibid 1 para 54.
20 Supra note 1.
21 SARFU supra note 1 para 147.
22 Ibid para 148.
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The constraints in s 33 (administrative justice) of the Constitution did not
apply, but other constraints imposed throughout the Constitution did. For
one thing, the exercise of powers under s 84(2) is expressly limited by the
terms of the section itself. The section makes in clear that the powers are to
be exercised by the President personally. In addition, s 101(1) of the
Constitution provides that:
‘A decision by the President must be in writing if it —
(a) is taken in terms of legislation; or
(b) has legal consequences.’
Most importantly, however, the court found that the exercise of
presidential power is also limited by the principle of legality. This was held in
the case to mean that ‘the President must act in good faith and must not
misconstrue the power.’23 These requirements were found to be implicit in
the Constitution.
RATIONALITY
The concept ‘administrative action’ was further considered in Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of South Africa: Ex parte President of the Republic of
South Africa.24 The question before the court, in this case, was whether the
decision of the President to bring an act into operation constituted
‘administrative action’.25 Referring to its decision in SARFU (discussed
above), the Constitutional Court described the Pharmaceuticals case as one of
the difficult ones. Whilst the power to bring legislation into force is derived
from legislation and is akin to the administrative process, the decision
whether to do so is determined by political judgment. Thus, the action
involved lay somewhere ‘between the law making process and the
administrative process’26 and did not amount to administrative action for the
purposes of s 33.
As with the two previous cases, the court here went on to find that the
President was bound to exercise the power concerned ‘lawfully and
consistently with the provisions of the Constitution in so far as they may be
applicable to the exercise of such power’.27 On the question of what would
meet the requirements of the rule of law, the court went further than it had
previously,28 finding that ‘[d]ecisions must be rationally related to the
purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary
23 Ibid.
24 Supra note 1.
25 It was alleged that the regulations necessary to give effect to the act had not been made when the
President purported to bring the act into operation. It was also stated that the President’s decision to bring
the act into force had been made on the basis of the Department of Health’s premature and erroneous
decision to request him to do so—see paras 6 and 7of the judgment.
26 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers supra note 1 para 79.
27 Ibid.
28 On this point, see Hoexter op cit note 2 at 507. See also Hugh Corder ‘Reinventing administrative
law in South Africa’ in Chris Finn (ed) Sunrise or Sunset? Administrative Law in the New Millennium (2000) 24
at 24–5.
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and inconsistent with this requirement’.29 The court went on to find that
bringing an act into operation without the regulatory structure being in
place was irrational as it rendered the legislation unworkable.30
The Constitutional Court, in Fedsure, SARFU and Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers seemed to have developed a somewhat peculiar approach to adminis-
trative justice.31 The court refused, in all three cases, to apply the right to
administrative justice but referred instead to principles of administrative law
‘that are ordinarily implied by that right’.32 Thus, although the acts had been
determined to fall outside of the scope of ‘administrative action’, they were
treated very much as though they were.33 The only basis for such an
approach is to limit the grounds on which review takes place, but the
approach in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers is difficult to explain on this basis. In
Fedsure and SARFU, the acts were scrutinized against the basic principle of
legality alone.34 The content of this principle appeared in both Fedsure and
SARFU to be incidents of the administrative law requirement of lawfulness.
The court’s finding that there was a requirement of rationality in
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, however, went beyond legality to the much
more controversial question of justifiability.35
This point leads to the question of how onerous the standard of rationality
is and how it compares to the standard of review for administrative actions.
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers the court held the rationality standard to be a
low one:
‘Rationality in this sense is a minimum threshold requirement applicable to the exercise of all public
power by members of the Executive and other functionaries. Action that fails to pass this threshold is
inconsistent with the requirements of our Constitution and therefore unlawful. . . A decision that is
objectively irrational is likely to be made only rarely but, if this does occur, a Court has the power to
intervene and set aside the irrational decision.’36
On the question of what the content of the requirement of rationality is, the
court found, relying on Prinsloo v Van der Linde 37 that ‘(a)s long as there is a
rational relationship between the method and object it is irrelevant that the
object could have been achieved in a different way’.38
The inclusion of rationality as a requirement for the legality of
non-administrative action, that is, action that does not involve the making of
policy or legislation, implies that ordinary administrative action is susceptible
to review on a higher standard. This raises the question of what ‘reasonable’
means in the context of the s 33 right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair.
29 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers supra note 1 para 85.
30 Ibid paras 88 and 89.
31 Hoexter has referred to the ‘curious dichotomy’ created by these cases (op cit note 2 at 507).
32 Ibid. See also Klaaren op cit note 12 at 212.
33 Hoexter op cit note 2 at 507.
34 Ibid at 507.
35 Ibid. See also Corder op cit note 28 at 24–5.
36 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers supra note 1 para 90.
37 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC).
38 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers supra note 1 para 90n108.
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REASONABLENESS
Reasonableness has always been a controversial ground of review in
administrative law, largely because of the idea that examining an act on the
basis of whether it is reasonable or not blurs the distinction between review
and appeal. South African common law dealt with this concern by following
the English symptomatic unreasonableness test with respect to the review of
an administrative decision. The locus classicus here is Union Government v
Union Steel Corporation 1928 AD 220, where this was said:
‘[N]owhere has it been held that unreasonableness is sufficient ground for interference; emphasis is
always laid upon the necessity of the unreasonableness being so gross that something else can be inferred
from it, either that it is ‘‘inexplicable except on the assumption of mala fides or ulterior motive,’’. . . or
that it amounts to proof that the person on whom the discretion is conferred has not applied his (sic)
mind to the matter’39
Thus, the unreasonableness itself was not relied upon. Rather it was the
presence of something else (mala fides or ulterior motive) which pointed to
unreasonableness. In effect, unreasonableness was not, in itself, a ground of
review at all. Established grounds of procedural review were relied upon.40
In addition, the unreasonableness had to be gross — the decision reached had
to be ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to
it.’41
This approach was heavily criticized. For example, Mureinik commented
as follows:
‘It is difficult to see why the fact that a decision is strikingly grossly unreasonable does not, on its own,
prove abuse of discretion. Or, for that matter, why unreasonableness does not, on its own, prove abuse
of discretion. After all, if we characterise a decision as unreasonable, we mean much more than that we
disagree with it, or that we consider it wrong.We mean that we judge it to lack plausible justification. If
so, how can we believe it to have been reached without an abuse of discretion?’ 42
The Appellate Division questioned the gross unreasonableness standard in
Theron v Ring van Wellington van die NG Sendingkerk.43 However, the
approach in Theron44 did not attract much support.45 The interim Constitu-
tion’s formulation of the ground of review was that ‘every person shall have
the right to administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons
given for it where any of his or her rights is affected or threatened’.46
39 1928 AD 220 at 237.
40 This was not the case for the review of delegated legislation, however. See Lawrence Baxter
Administrative Law (1984) 478–9.
41 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. See also National
Transport Commission v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 726 (A).
42 Etienne Mureinik ‘Reconsidering review: Participation and accountability’ 1993 Acta Juridica 35 at
40–6.
43 1976 (2) SA 1 (A).
44 Jansen JA in Theron supra note 43 stated that there is, in administrative law, a formal yardstick for
intervention in review. This formal yardstick meant that a court could not question how a body or official
exercised discretion but only whether that individual or body exercised discretion. However, he then stated
that it should be accepted that the law had changed (or at least was changing) and that this formal yardstick
was extended, in respect of purely judicial decisions, to cover review on the basis of unreasonableness (on its
own).
45 Cf Hira v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 69 (A).
46 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, s 24(d) (hereafter ‘interim
Constitution’).
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Following the coming into operation of the interim Constitution, it was
held that,
‘[t]he test of ‘‘gross unreasonableness’’ in view of the testing rights given to the courts in the Constitution
of the Republic of SouthAfricaAct, 1993 does not accord with the modern approach to judicial review,
particularly when applied to a constitution such as the South African one which contains a chapter of
fundamental rights’.47
Another case decided under the Interim Constitution’s administrative law
provision was Carephone v Marcus.48 Here the court found that there had been
a widening of the scope of review in South Africa. This extended scope was
based upon the constitutional provision that administrative action be
justifiable in relation to the reasons given. The court also specified that
‘justifiable’ does not mean simply just or correct but refers to something that
is legally and morally defensible, thus preserving the distinction between
review and appeal. Most importantly, the court acknowledged that value
judgments will have to be made under the provision, and that ‘merits, in
some cases will thus, of necessity, come into play’.49 However, the
distinction between review and appeal may still be maintained if the judge is
aware that he or she cannot substitute his or her own opinion — the
question is whether the outcome is rationally justifiable.
Academic opinion supported this view that s 24(d) overruled both
symptomatic and gross unreasonableness as necessary for unreasonableness
review.50 The position taken by commentators was that justifiability was
used as a synonym for reasonableness.51 The factors to be taken into account
in an enquiry into justifiability under s 24(d) were said to be whether:
‘(a) the decision-maker has considered all the serious objections to the decision taken, and has answers
which plausibly meet them;
(b) the decision-maker has considered all the serious alternatives to the decision taken, and has
discarded them for plausible reasons; and
(c) there is a rational connection between premises and conclusion: between the information
(evidence and argument) before the decision-maker and the decision that it reached.’52
The formulation above clearly points to both rationality and proportional-
ity being included as requirements for justifiable administrative action. The
view that s 24(d) allowed for reasonableness to be a ground of review on its
own appeared to be confirmed by s 33 of the final Constitution. According
to s 33(1), ‘[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair’.
However, the question whether reasonableness means something more
than rationality appears to be undecided. Two developments have occurred
47 Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana Ltd v Reynolds 1995 (3) BCLR 305 (B) at 325.
48 1998 (10) BCLR 1326 (LAC).
49 Carephone supra note 48 para 36.
50 Etienne Mureinik ‘A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 at
39–40.
51 See Lourens du Plessis & Hugh Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994)
169.
52 Mureinik op cit note 50 at 41.
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to confuse, rather than clarify matters. First, the Promotion ofAdministrative
Justice Act (PAJA) provides the following:
‘A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if the exercise of the
power or the performance of the function authorised by the empowering provision, in pursuance of
which the administrative action was purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person
could have so exercised the power or performed the function.’53
This appears to reintroduce the standard of gross (Wednesbury) unreason-
ableness.54 More importantly, for the purposes of this argument, however, is
the fact that rationality is a separate ground for review under this act,55 which
is an indication that, at least under PAJA, reasonableness means something
different from, and arguably more than, rationality.
The second and more problematic development is the decision of the
Constitutional Court in Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western
Cape.56 The minority judgment accepted that justifiability (the term used in
s 24 of the interim Constitution) included an element of substantive review
and cited Carephone with approval,57 stating that,
‘[i]n our view, the concept of justifiability requires more than a mere rational connection between the
reasons and the decision. . .Although a rational connection would certainly be necessary, it would not
on its own be sufficient. All exercises of public power have to have a rational basis, this is one of the
foundations of legality, or lawfulness as required by s 33(a).’58
The judges relied, for this proposition, on the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
case. They went on to find that justifiability, although it does not amount to
the court determining what would, in its view, have been the best outcome,
does require ‘something more substantial and persuasive’ than a rational
connection.59 This something more appears to be encapsulated in the
principle of proportionality, referred to as a requirement of justifiability in
the minority judgment.60
However, the majority rejected this and expressed the view that
justifiability (reasonableness under the final Constitution) required only that
the decision be a rational one, taken lawfully and to a proper purpose.61 It is
true that the majority did leave open the possibility for justifiability or
reasonableness to encompass a more intensive standard of review than mere
rationality, but this case was held to be an inappropriate one in which to set
such a higher standard.62
There are a number of grounds upon which this decision may be
criticized. The one relevant to this article is that, as a consequence of the
53 Section 6 (2)(h) of Act 3 of 2000.
54 The argument has been made that the section cannot be read in this way if it is to pass constitutional
scrutiny. On this issue, see Hoexter op cit note 2 at 518–19; Cora Hoexter The New Constitutional and
Administrative Law; Volume 2: Administrative Law (2002) 185–7 and Iain Currie & Jonathan Klaaren The
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) 169–73.
55 Section 6(2)(f).
56 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC).
57 Mokgoro and Sachs JJ in Bel Porto supra note 56 paras 162–4.
58 Bel Porto supra note 56 para 164.
59 Ibid.
60 Bel Porto supra note 56 para 162.
61 Chaskalson CJ in Bel Porto supra note 56 para 89.
62 Bel Porto supra note 56 para 128.
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decision, legislative and executive acts are reviewable on the same basis as
administrative action. This is inconsistent with any attempt to limit the
review of acts determined to involve policy making.
Review for reasonableness or justifiability has similarly been equated, in a
number of other cases, with the rationality requirement, held to be part of
the principle of legality in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers. In Paola v Jeeva NO,
for example, the court found that the Constitution had widened the scope
for review to include procedural fairness, lawfulness and reasonableness.63
However, the action in question was tested against the requirement of
rationality alone.64 The fact that the principle of legality as set out in Fedsure,
SARFU and, most importantly, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, was developed
to review executive and legislative action, rather than administrative action,
is not taken into account in the cases referred to.
The Constitutional Court has more recently applied the reasonableness
standard of review in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism. 65 The case was decided under the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. In a unanimous judgment, the court
criticised the Wednesbury unreasonableness formulation, finding that ‘[e]ven
if it may be thought that the language of s 6(2)(h), if taken literally, might set
a standard such that a decision would rarely if ever be found unreasonable,
that is not the proper constitutional meaning which should be attached to the
subsection. The subsection must be construed consistently with the
Constitution and in particular s 33 which requires administrative action to be
‘‘reasonable’’’.66 The decision in Bel Porto is referred to only once in the Bato
Star judgment and then only for what it had to say about transformation, not
the majority judgment’s interpretation of reasonableness.
In Bato Star, the Constitutional Court appears to have quietly moved away
from the equation of reasonableness with rationality in Bel Porto. In Bato Star,
the court did refer to the idea of judicial deference as a fundamental part of
the separation of powers doctrine67 but noted also that ‘[t]his does not mean
. . . that where the decision is one which will not reasonably result in the
achievement of the goal, or which is not reasonably supported on the facts or
not reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a Court may not review
that decision.’68 Moreover, the court, per O’Regan J, set out a number of
factors to be used in determining whether a decision is reasonable, namely,
‘the nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of factors relevant
63 2002 (2) SA 391 (D) at 403
64 Ibid. See also South African Post Office Ltd v Chairperson, Western Cape Provincial Tender Board 2001(2) SA
675 (C) paras 20–21.
65 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 687(CC).
66 Bato Star supra note 65 para 44.
67 Ibid para 46.
68 Ibid para 48.
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to the decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing interests involved and
the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being of those affected’.69
This goes considerably further than Bel Porto’s standard of a rational
decision made lawfully and with a proper purpose and is consistent with the
decision in the Carephone case (discussed above). In particular, competing
interests and the effect the decision may have on affected individuals are
concerns in the application of a proportionality standard, not the lower
rationality standard.
As may be seen from the discussion above, there are a number of bases on
which one may question the application of the standard of reasonableness to
exercises of state power by the courts. The majority of the Constitutional
Court in Bel Porto subjected administrative action to review on the same
ground as that used for the review of executive and legislative action,
rationality. Given that the reasoning in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers was that
executive action should be subject to a lower standard of review than
administrative action, this is clearly problematic. Finally, in its most recent
case on administrative action, the Constitutional Court has incorporated
elements of a proportionality test into the reasonableness standard.
That reasonableness should include an element of proportionality is
additionally borne out by an examination of other areas of the law, to which
I now turn.
SOCIO–ECONOMIC RIGHTS
The right of access to adequate housing, protected in s 26 of the
Constitution, and the right of access to health care, food, water and social
security, protected in s 27 of the Constitution are qualified by a standard of
reasonableness.70 The interpretation of this standard by the courts in the
context of social and economic rights is useful because the concerns about
the appropriate role of the judiciary are much the same as they are when
courts review the exercise of public power in the context of administrative
law.
The inclusion of social and economic rights in the Constitution was first
examined in the First Certification case.71 In this case, the Constitutional
Court made it clear that such rights are justiciable under the Constitution.
Objections to the direct enforceability of social and economic rights are
generally based on a separation of powers argument. The concern is that
these rights require a court to pronounce on matters that should be left to the
executive or the legislature because they have both the mandate and the
expertise to deal with them. On the question of whether the inclusion of
socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights violates the principle of
separation of powers, the Constitutional Court in the First Certification case
69 Ibid para 45.
70 As are other second and third generation rights in the Bill of Rights (see s 29(1)(b), 29(2) and 24(b)).
Discussion of these is beyond the scope of this paper.
71 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR
1253 (CC).
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stated that the enforcement of civil and political rights such as the right to
equality and the right to a fair trial, would often also have budgetary
implications. These implications did not in themselves mean that the rights,
whether civil and political or socio-economic, were not justiciable by a
court.72 The fact that socio-economic rights are directly enforceable in court
has been subsequently confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Government
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,73 and Minister of Health v Treatment
Action Campaign (1).74
However, the enforceability of these rights has not been taken to mean
that the courts are completely free to pronounce on the merits of state policy.
A unanimous court in Grootboom, in deciding on a challenge to government
housing policy, stated that the particulars of the housing programme should
be left up to the executive and the legislature to work out. The role of the
court was described as follows:
‘A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable
measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent. The
question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to
recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the State to meet its obligations.
Many of these would meet the requirement of reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so,
this requirement is met.’75
In this respect, the Constitutional Court’s treatment of the minimum core
obligation is also significant. The United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, which is tasked with monitoring states’
compliance with the Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) has set out the idea of core minimum obligations with respect to
the rights protected in the ICESCR as follows:
‘[A] minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of
each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. . . If the Covenant were to be read in such a way
as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être. By
the same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum
core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying within the country concerned.’
76
Although it is clear from the above that a state’s resource limitations will
be taken into account in determining its minimum core obligations, the
Committee has also indicated that a state claiming a lack of resources will
have to ‘demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that
are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those
minimum obligations’.77
72 First Certification case supra note 71 para 77.
73 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 20.
74 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para 25.
75 Grootboom supra note 73 para 41.
76 Para 10 of General Comment 3 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (5th
Session 1990) UN Doc E/1991/23.
77 Ibid.
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At a national law level, it has been argued before the Constitutional Court
in South Africa that the court should, in line with international law,78 set out
the state’s minimum core obligations with respect to the rights to housing
and health. The court has twice declined to do so. In Grootboom, the court
cited a lack of information as its main reason.79 In TAC, however, the
Constitutional Court dealt with the issue at some length and relied more
directly on a separation of powers argument for its refusal to set out a core
minimum obligation. The court stated that the judiciary was not
‘institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political enquiries necessary for
determining what the minimum-core standards. . . should be, nor for deciding how public revenues
should most effectively be spent. . . Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where Court orders
could have multiple social and economic consequences for the community. The Constitution
contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the Courts, namely, to require the State to take
measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to
evaluation. Such determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not
in themselves directed at rearranging budgets. In this way the judicial, legislative and executive
functions achieve appropriate constitutional balance.’80
With respect to the determination of the reasonableness of a state policy,
the socio-economic rights cases illustrate that a court will steer clear of
deciding what the best policy would be in a particular case and will also stop
short of telling government how to spend state resources. However, in each
of the two cases referred to, the court was quite willing to find the impugned
policy81 to be unreasonable. In Grootboom, the basis for this finding was, due
to the facts of the case, quite limited. The court held that the government’s
failure to provide temporary relief for those in desperate need was
unreasonable.82 More significantly, the court in TAC examined each of the
justifications provided by government for its policy against the reasonable-
ness standard. The reasons for this rejection ranged from a simple lack of
evidence to support government’s claims83 to — most importantly for the
purposes of this paper — a lack of proportionality between means and end.
Thus, the court dealt with the government’s argument that wider provision
of the drug Nevirapine would result in people developing a resistance to it as
follows:
‘Although resistant strains of HIV might exist after a single dose of Nevirapine, this mutation is likely to
be transient. At most there is a possibility of such resistance persisting, and although this possibility
cannot be excluded, its weight is small in comparison with the potential benefit of providing a single
78 The idea of a minimum core obligation is set out in General Comment 3 of the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Although the General Comment is a non-binding
instrument, it has been accepted as an authoritative interpretation of the obligations in the ICESCR — see
Henry Steiner & Philip Alston International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (2000) 265.
79 Grootboom supra note 73 para 32.
80 TAC supra note 74 paras 37 and 38.
81 The ‘state housing programme in the area of the CapeMetropolitan Council’ in Grootboom (supra note
73 at para 99) and the policy of the government to restrict the provision of Nevirapine to prevent
mother-to-child-transmission of the HI virus to certain pilot sites in the TAC case (supra note 74 para 19).
82 Grootboom supra note 73 paras 95 and 99.
83 This was the reason given for the rejection of the government’s claim that Nevirapine would not be
effective in preventing mother-to-child transmission without the ‘full package’ of treatment including
counselling (see the TAC case supra note 74 paras 57–8) and the government’s claim that Nevirapine was
not yet proven to be safe (TAC supra note 74 paras 60–4).
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tablet of Nevirapine to the mother and a few drops to her baby at the time of birth. The prospects of the
child surviving if infected are so slim and the nature of the suffering so grave that the risk of some
resistance manifesting at some time in the future is well worth running.’84
In the most recent case on social and economic rights, Khosa v Minister of
Social Development,85 the Constitutional Court dealt with the question of
whether s 27’s protection of the right to social security extends to permanent
residents who would qualify for the benefits were it not for the fact that they
are not citizens.86 The court held that a number of factors should be taken
into account in determining whether the legislation’s exclusion of perma-
nent residents was reasonable: ‘the purpose served by social security, the
impact of the exclusion on permanent residents and the relevance of the
citizenship requirement to that purpose’.87 This test corresponds in
fundamentals with that used by the court in Bato Star88 to review the
reasonableness of administrative action.89
In short, it seems that the reasonableness test used to evaluate administra-
tive action and that used to evaluate government policy or legislation on
social and economic rights is the same. Whilst courts are to stop short of
substituting their own views for those of the administrator, legislature or
executive body, they do have to make a determination that includes looking
at the proportionality of the measure.
DELICTUAL CLAIMS FOR UNREASONABLE STATE OMISSIONS
Another area in which the courts have been struggling to determine the
appropriate level of deference to the state is state liability for omissions in
delict. As with the review of executive and legislative action dealt with in
Fedsure,90, SARFU91 and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers92 above, developments
in this area stem from a principle of accountability of public bodies and this
makes for interesting comparison.
The general principle is and has always been that administrative bodies are
liable in delict for damages caused during the performance of their statutory
duties in the same way as any other legal person.93 However, public bodies
have traditionally been considered to be a special case when it comes to
liability for claims in delict and contract under the common law. There are a
number of reasons for treating public bodies differently, namely,
‘(i) imposing liability on public bodies would make bad economic sense; (ii) liability would inhibit the
freedom of action of these bodies; (iii) it would be inappropriate for courts to control elected bodies and
84 TAC supra note 74 para 59.
85 2004 (6)SA 505 (CC)
86 Khosa supra note 85 para 49.
87 Ibid.
88 Supra note 6.
89 Discussed above.
90 Supra note 1.
91 Supra note 1.
92 Supra note 1.
93 See s 1 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957.
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tell them how to exercise their discretionary powers; and (iv) the victims in these cases have alternative
remedies which makes recognition of a delictual liability not only dangerous but also superfluous.’94
The first three reasons are similar to those described earlier in this article in
relation to the review of executive and legislative action and the evaluation
of government’s social and economic policies.
In short, the interest of the public in having an efficient administration,
free to act consistently with the public interest and to react to changes in the
public interest must be weighed against that of that of individuals who have
suffered loss as a result of state action. Public authorities wield a vast amount
of power and have the potential to cause a great deal of damage. Personal
claims against the officials concerned would place a very onerous burden on
such officials. Also, the claimant may not be able to recover economic loss in
a claim against an official in her or his personal capacity.
On the other hand, there is concern about the possible ‘chilling effect’ of
holding public bodies accountable for economic loss. The nature of the
administration is such that a large number of decisions have to be made
within a relatively short space of time for the state to operate effectively. The
knowledge that every action was potentially susceptible to claims in delict
could have the effect of making the administration overly cautious and,
hence, slow. In addition, there was also the practical problem that
wrongfulness, an element of a claim in delict, could not be proved where the
public authority could show that its actions were authorised by statute.95 A
general and rigid principle of immunity was rejected under the common law
and different approaches were developed to determine when the state was
liable for damages for its action or inaction. The approaches were, however,
based on quite a strict notion of deference to the legislature and the
executive. 96
As with all other areas of law, this area was significantly affected by the
coming into operation of the Constitution. Reference to a constitutional
principle of accountability was first made by Davis J in Faircape Property
Developers v Premier, Western Cape (Faircape 1).97 The plaintiff in the case was a
property development company, which had bought the relevant property on
the condition that certain restrictive conditions in the title deed be
94 Basil Markensinis et al Tortious Liability of Statutory Bodies: A Comparative and Economic Analysis of Five
English Cases (1999) 49–50, as cited in Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd v The Premier of the Western Cape
(Faircape 2) 2002 (6) SA 180 (C). See also Johannesburg City Council v Knop 1995 (2) SA 1 (A) at 33.
95 See Hoexter op cit note 54 at 282–3.
96 First, a distinction was made between ‘policy’ and ‘operational’ decisions. ‘Policy’ decisions were
exempt from claims based in delict because they related to matters inappropriate for the consideration of a
court. See Lord Wilberforce in Anns v London Borough of Merton [1977] 2 All ER 492 at 500, as cited in
Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [1999] 3All ER 193 at 220. This approach was not favoured because
of the difficulty of drawing the distinction with any degree of accuracy. The second approach was to
examine the authorisation in the statute to determine whether the Legislature had intended (expressly or
implicitly) claims in delict to be permitted. See Hoexter op cit not 54 at 283. See also Johannesburg
Municipality v African Realty Trust Ltd 1927 AD 163 at 173
97 2000 (2) SA 54 (C) (Faircape 1).
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removed.98 The Minister approved the removal of the title deed restrictions
and the property was transferred to Faircape.99
However, the application form and the plan submitted with it had made it
clear that the purpose of the application was to build a two-storey town
house development. The application was published in the Government
Gazette in those terms and objections were received. The Urban Planning
Committee of the Council, taking all of this into consideration, then voted
to approve the removal of the restrictions.100 Some time between the
recommendation of the Council and the decision by the Minister, a new
plan was submitted for the construction of a four-storey block of flats. The
Minister approved the application without noticing the change.101
Faircape demolished the existing building and started excavations. A
neighbour objected to the erection of the flats and took the matter on
review. The Minister’s decision to grant the application to remove the
restrictions was set aside.102 Faircape had already been interdicted from
proceeding with construction and, following the judgment, had to re-apply
for the removal of the restrictions. The purpose was described as the erection
of a block of flats. Many objections were received and the application was
eventually granted in May 1998. Faircape alleged loss in the amount of
R1 054 407.103 The defendant raised an exception to the claim, saying that
there was no cause of action — there was no liability for the negligent
rejection or approval of an application because no duty of care was owed.104
Davis J’s starting point was that of the determination of wrongfulness. He
found that the test for wrongfulness, based on the legal convictions of the
community, ‘must take account of the spirit, purport and object of the
Constitution’.105 One of the objects of the Constitution was to create a
‘culture of justification’. Promoting such a culture necessitates holding
public bodies accountable to the public they serve when they act negligently
and without due care.106 There were no means by which the authority could
be held accountable in terms of the Act and the lack of a remedy violated the
principle of accountability. Thus, Davis J dismissed the exception to the
claim that there was no cause of action.
In Faircape 2, Davis J had to apply the principle of accountability to decide
the merits of the claim. In finding that the Minister was negligent and that
damages were owed to Faircape, Davis J noted that ‘a finding of
wrongfulness may slow down the consideration of applications but only to
the extent that they should be carefully read and properly considered’.107
98 Faircape 1 supra note 97 at 57.
99 Ibid.
100 Faircape 2 supra note 94 at 3–4.
101 Ibid at 4–6.
102 See Beck v Premier, Western Cape 1998 (3) SA 487 (C).
103 Faircape 1 supra note 97 at 57.
104 Ibid at 59–60.
105 Ibid supra note 97at 65.
106 Ibid.
107 Faircape 2 supra note 94 at 11.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL434
The crux of the judgment appeared to be that, on balance, the potential
slowing down of the administrative process was simply not as important as
the principle of accountability’s insistence on a remedy for those ‘gravely
prejudiced by gross negligence of an official’.108 Davis J also indicated that
the potential chilling effect could be mitigated by the requirements of
forseeability and proximity, as well as ‘an exercise of proportionality’.109
These factors could act to limit liability.
The finding in Faircape 1 was referred to with approval by the Supreme
Court of Appeal in Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board:
‘I agree with the observations of Davis J in Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd v Premier, Western Cape
that in deciding whether a statutory provision grounds a claim in damages the determination of the legal
convictions of the community must take account of the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution,
and that the constitutional principle of justification embraces the concept of accountability. This in turn
must of course weigh in the balance when determining legal responsibility for the consequences of
public malfeasance.’110
The principle of accountability in the above cases has been used as a basis
from which to hold public bodies accountable for negligent omissions in a
number of subsequent cases.111 However, the Faircape decision was appealed
to the Supreme Court of Appeal and the decision on the merits was reversed.
The SCA made it clear that it approved the principle of accountability as a
basis from which to hold public bodies accountable for negligent omissions
in delict both in Faircape 112 and subsequently in Carmichele.113 However, the
SCA’s finding that the Minister’s action was not wrongful is significant for
the interpretation of the principle of accountability itself.
The difference in the application of the principle of accountability may, it
is submitted, be explained with reference to the role of reasonableness in the
wrongfulness enquiry. In Faircape 2, Davis J used a dictum from Olitzki
which illustrates part of the role reasonableness plays in the wrongfulness
enquiry:
‘ ‘‘The conduct is wrongful, not because of the breach of the statutory duty per se, but because it is
reasonable in the circumstances to compensate the plaintiff for the infringement of his legal right’’. The
determination of reasonableness here in turn depends on whether affording the plaintiff a remedy is
congruent with the court’s appreciation of the sense of justice of the community.’114
Davis J referred to the idea that there may be some cases inappropriate for
judicial determination. In deciding which cases fell into this category, one
would examine whether a court is actually competent to make a finding on
the issue, whether it is, in fact, possible to reach a ‘right answer’, and whether
108 Ibid.
109 Faircape 2 supra note 94 at 9.
110 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA); 2001 (8) BCLR 779 (SCA).
111 See Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) and Van Eeden v Minister of
Safety and Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA).
112 Premier, Western Cape v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd 2003 (6) SA 13 (SCA) (Faircape SCA) paras
40 and 41.
113 Faircape SCA supra note 112 para 34.
114 Olitzki supra note 110 para 12 (quoting LAWSA (first reissue) vol 8 part 1 para 61) and Faircape 2 supra
note 94 at 9.
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adjudication might be damaging to other valuable objectives.115 This was
also a concern in the later SCA decisions. Both Carmichele and Faircape 2 set
out the parameters of public accountability with reference to the following
passage from Van Duivenboden:
‘The norm of accountability, however, need not always translate constitutional duties into private law
duties enforceable by inaction for damages, for there will be cases in which other appropriate remedies
are available for holding the State to account. Where the conduct in issue relates to questions of State
policy, or where it affects a broad and indeterminate segment of society, constitutional accountability
might at times be appropriately secured through the political process or through one of the variety of
other remedies that the courts are capable of granting. . . . However, where the State’s failure occurs in
circumstances that offer no effective remedy other than an action for damages the norm of
accountability will, in my view, ordinarily demand the recognition of a legal duty unless there are other
considerations affecting the public interest that outweigh that norm.’116
This, in my view, does not differ significantly from Davis J’s assessment
above and, on the facts, there were no other appropriate remedies and the
action did not affect ‘a broad and indeterminate segment of society’. The
reason for the SCA’s different conclusions on wrongfulness is, thus, to be
found elsewhere. In its wrongfulness enquiry, the SCA, in Faircape went on
to deal with whether the inaction in question was reasonable:
‘If a reasonable man, placed in the circumstances of the defendant, would have foreseen that his conduct
might endanger or prejudice others in regard to their legally protected interests, then the defendant is
deemed to have been under a legal duty towards such others to exercise appropriate care.’117
One immediate concern with this enquiry is that it appears to be
substantially the same question as that asked in the negligence enquiry of a
delictual claim. This was acknowledged to be so in the judgment: ‘ [A]
similar question is inevitably repeated when one is determining the issue of
negligence. In the context of determining wrongfulness, the question relates
only to whether there should be a legal duty imposed on the Minister not to
infringe a legal interest of an applicant.’ 118 It seems right to say that the
reasonableness of the inaction must be factored into the wrongfulness
enquiry as it affects the question of whether a duty is owed. However, the
reasonableness of that inaction at the wrongfulness stage of the enquiry
cannot, it is submitted, revolve around what the Minister foresaw. The
enquiry into whether a duty was owed (wrongfulness) is a more abstract, less
subjective one.
For the purposes of the argument in this paper, the real problem with the
SCA’s judgment in Faircape, is that it indicates that the legal convictions of the
community, informed now by the constitutional principle of accountability,
would not demand a remedy in this case. However, when administrative
action is involved, the standard of reasonableness applied in the wrongfulness
enquiry cannot be more or less onerous than that applied in the review of
such action. The fact that a body has acted outside its powers does not mean
115 Davis J made this point with reference to François du Bois ‘Getting wrongfulness right: A Ciceronian
attempt’, (then still unpublished), but later published in 2000 Acta Juridica 1: see Faircape 2 supra note 94 at 8.
116 Van Duivenboden supra note 111 para 21.
117 Millner, cited in Faircape SCA supra note 112 para 42.
118 Faircape SCA supra note 112 para 46.
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that it has acted wrongfully,119 but at the same time wrongfulness cannot
exist unless the body has acted outside its powers. For the official making an
administrative decision, this means that he or she must act lawfully,
reasonably and with procedural fairness.
In Faircape (SCA), the crux of the court’s decision was that it was
reasonable for the Minister to have granted the application because he could
not have foreseen that a decision in favour of Faircape would result in them
experiencing prejudice and monetary loss.120 The court found that wrong-
fulness must be determined with reference to the applicant: ‘One must ask
whether it was wrongful in so far as an applicant in the position of Faircape is
concerned’.121 It also found that ‘the Minister was entitled to assume that
Faircape, as a developer of property, would have checked the application
itself’.122 Thus, the fact that theMinister failed to notice that the original plan
had been replaced by a plan inconsistent with the application did not mean
that his actions towards Faircape were unreasonable:
‘The procedures that were not complied with were enacted for the protection and in the interest of
potential objectors and not in the interests of applicants for the removal of restrictions. On the contrary,
it is such applicants who are called upon to comply with those provisions as a precondition to securing
such removal. Generally, as a matter of legal policy, an applicant who fails to fulfil that obligation should
not be entitled to damages even if the Minister negligently fails to detect the applicant’s error.’123
I have argued above that these questions are more appropriate to a
negligence enquiry. However, the crucial point for the purposes of this
paper, is that the standard of reasonableness applied by the SCA to evaluate
the Minister’s action was far too low. An application of one’s mind is a
minimum requirement for the reasonable exercise of administrative func-
tions. In fact, it is part of the rationality requirement, the lowest standard in
the reasonableness enquiry. It is worth re-stating the enquiry here:
‘(a) the decision-maker has considered all the serious objections to the decision taken, and has answers
which plausibly meet them;
(b) the decision-maker has considered all the serious alternatives to the decision taken, and has
discarded them for plausible reasons; and
(c) there is a rational connection between premises and conclusion: between the information
(evidence and argument) before the decision-maker and the decision taken.’124
It cannot be said, on the facts of Faircape, that there was a rational
connection ‘between the information evidence and argument before the
decision-maker and the decision that it reached’. The fact that the plan was
completely at odds with the information on the application form destroys the
required link between information and conclusion.
The conclusion reached on the facts, however, is less important than the
courts’ approach to the concept of reasonableness. In the cases above, the
courts have been grappling with the content of what is a relatively new
119 See Hoexter op cit note 54 at 283 on this point.
120 Faircape SCA supra note 112 para 46.
121 Ibid para 42.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid para 49.
124 Mureinik op cit note 50 at 41.
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principle of accountability. Having found that this constitutional principle
makes it possible for public bodies to be liable in delict for damages for
negligent omissions, the courts then had to determine how far that principle
could extend. In doing so, it is submitted, insufficient attention has been paid
to the principles of administrative law. Public bodies are a special case: this
may sometimes translate into a greater level of accountability for them than
for private persons and it may sometimes demand less.125 This is an issue for
the first part of the wrongfulness enquiry: whether the legal convictions of
society deem it reasonable to grant compensation. The next part of the
wrongfulness enquiry, whether the action or inaction concerned was
reasonable, must be determined with respect to reasonableness as an
administrative law ground of review.
CONCLUSION
The court’s starting point in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers was the transition to
a new legal order — the move from parliamentary to constitutional
supremacy.126 The court referred to the judgment of Ackermann J in
S v Makwanyane127 for the underlying rationale of the new legal dispensa-
tion:
‘We have moved from a past characterised by much which was arbitrary and unequal in the operation of
the law to a present and a future in a constitutional State where State action must be such that it is
capable of being analysed and justified rationally. The idea of the constitutional State presupposes a
system whose operation can be rationally tested against or in terms of the law. Arbitrariness, by its very
nature, is dissonant with these core concepts of our new constitutional order.’128
The court went on to find that the requirement that all exercises of public
power be rational was an ‘incident of the ‘culture of justification’ described
by Mureinik.129 Similarly, the principle of accountability developed in
Faircape 1 was based on the same value in the Constitution. Davis J referred
the same idea, developed in Mureinik’s article in support of the idea that the
Constitution ‘must lead to a culture of justification — a culture in which
every exercise of power is expected to be justified’.130 He went on to find
that justification, in the context of state negligence, includes responsibility of
125 In the Van Duivenboden case (supra note 111 para 19) this point was made as follows: ‘The reluctance to
impose liability for omissions is often informed by a laissez faire concept of liberty that recognizes that
individuals are entitled to ‘‘mind their own business’’ even when they might reasonably be expected to avert
harm, and by the inequality of imposing liability on one person who fails to act when there are others who
might equally be faulted . . . However, those barriers are less formidable where the conduct of a public
authority or a public functionary is in issue, for it is usually the very business of a public authority or
functionary to serve the interests of others, and its duty to do so will differentiate it from others who
similarly fail to act to avert harm. The imposition of legal duties on public authorities and functionaries is
inhibited instead by the perceived utility of permitting them the freedom to provide public services without
the chilling effect of the threat of litigation if they happen to act negligently and the spectre of limitless
liability. That last consideration ought not to be unduly exaggerated, however, bearing in mind that the
requirements for establishing negligence, and a legally causative link, provide considerable practical scope
for harnessing liability within acceptable bounds.’
126 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers supra note 1 para 45.
127 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).
128 Makwanyane supra note 127 para 156, cited in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers supra note 61 para 84.
129 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers supra note 1 para 85n107, referring to Mureinik op cit note 50 at 32.
130 Mureinik op cit note 50 at 32.
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the state for the consequences of its negligent action. This is what is required
by a principle of accountability.131
The cases discussed in this article all address the question of what the limits
of public power should be and the extent to which a court can enquire into
the reasonableness of state action or inaction. Reasonableness as a concept
begins at rationality, as the minimum threshold, moves on to proportionality
and ends with a value judgement on what the best approach in a particular
case would be. The exercise of public power is a special case because of the
separation of powers principle. This principle rests on a number of concerns
addressed in all the cases (administrative review, socio-economic rights and
delict) above:
(a) courts do not have the mandate of the electorate to pronounce on
certain issues;
(b) courts do not have the capacity to second-guess executive action; and
(c) extending the ambit of delictual actions, or administrative review for
that matter, will result in a slowing down of government action.
With social and economic rights, the courts have been specifically
mandated to consider government’s social and economic policy on the basis
of reasonableness. This includes rationality and proportionality but does not
go as far as allowing a court to substitute its own judgment for that of the
executive because it does not itself have the expertise to decide on the ‘right’
policy. Similarly, with the review of administrative action, one begins from
the point that s 33 of the Constitution requires reasonableness which, on the
face of it, means more than rationality. However, the courts have been
unclear on this issue. Given the fact that the concerns underlying the
justiciability of social and economic rights are very similar, there is no reason
for reasonableness under administrative review to mean something different.
This argument is supported by the fact that executive action and legislative
action, which require a level of judicial restraint, have been held to be
reviewable on the basis of rationality. Finally, the wrongfulness test in delict,
as applied to public bodies makes sense if one adopts the same content for
reasonableness as one applies in the other two areas. Again, this is because the
same concerns about separation of powers and the ability of government to
do its job effectively and efficiently are the same here. In all three cases,
reasonableness stops short of allowing a court to substitute its view of what
the best approach would have been for that of the decision or policy-maker.
The development of a principle of legality has been discussed in an article
on the internationalisation of administrative law in other common law
jurisdictions namely, New Zealand, Canada, Australia and England.
Although the context is slightly different — the issue being the role of
unincorporated treaties in administrative law — the concerns about the
131 Faircape 1 supra note 97 at 65.
REVIEWING REASONABLENESS: AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD 439
legitimacy of judicial review are the same. The traditional argument has been
described as follows:
‘[I]f judges are permitted to chip away at the right of the legislature to declare when its delegates have an
unfettered discretion, soon the space of discretion will be squeezed to vanishing point and the
administrative decisions will become vulnerable to review on the basis of the judges’ highly contingent
sense of fundamental legal values.’132
It has been suggested that at least part of the answer to this problem of the
legitimacy of judicial review lies in the development of a principle of legality,
sourced in a ‘particular conception of democratic legal culture, the culture of
justification, in which decision-makers are obliged to justify their decisions
by showing either how the decisions conform to those values, or that they
are justifiable departures from those values’.133 The principle is described as a
constitutional one and, with respect to how intrusive the standard of review
should be, it has been argued that this should depend on the context.134 This
allows for some variability.135 This culture of justification is precisely the
basis from which the South African courts have developed the principles of
legality and accountability. However, the principles need to be more
carefully considered and more consistently applied.
132 David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Michael Taggart ‘The principle of legality in administrative law:
Internationalisation as constitutionalism’ (2001) 1 Oxford University Commonwealth LJ at 5–6.
133 Ibid at 6.
134 Ibid.
135 See generally Hoexter op cit note 2.
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